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Women’s Economic Standing, Marriage Timing, and
Cross-National Contexts of Gender
Proponents of the theory of specialization and
exchange hypothesize that in any national con-
text, women’s higher economic standing will de-
crease their chance of marriage. Some re-
searchers suggest, however, that only in
industrialized countries with a high degree of
role differentiation by gender does the inverse
relationship between women’s economic stand-
ing and the chance of marriage exist. To eval-
uate contrasting cross-national predictions, I
test with longitudinal data and standardized
methods whether the inverse relationship exists
in 3 similarly affluent industrialized countries
that vary in their degree of role differentiation
by gender: the United States, Japan (a context
more differentiated by gender than the United
States), and Sweden (a context less differenti-
ated by gender than the United States). Con-
trary to the prediction that develops out of the
theory of specialization and exchange, results
indicate that women’s higher levels of income
discourage first marriage formation in Japan,
but encourage it in the United States and Swe-
den.
Does the expanding economic role of women
weaken the institution of marriage in all contexts
or only in contexts where men’s and women’s
roles are highly differentiated? Although this is-
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sue has received some attention in analyses of a
single industrialized country (e.g., South, 2001;
Sweeney, 2002), it has received limited attention
cross-nationally among industrialized countries.
In this study, I investigate whether an inverse
relationship between women’s economic stand-
ing (as measured by income) and marriage tim-
ing (as measured by the chance of first marriage
in a time interval) is present in all national con-
texts (i.e., the universality hypothesis) or only in
national contexts with a relatively high degree of
role differentiation by gender (i.e., the gender-
contextual variation hypothesis). This is the first
study to evaluate systematically the competing
hypotheses cross-nationally. The cross-national
framework permits a more general test of the hy-
potheses by allowing the inclusion of a broad
range of contexts of gendered role differentia-
tion. Such a range is difficult to obtain, even over
a few decades, within a single industrialized
country because of constraints imposed by cul-
tural homogeneity. Three countries (Japan, the
United States, and Sweden) are selected for anal-
ysis because (a) they occupy contrasting points
on a continuum of role differentiation by gender,
even though they are similarly affluent (Norris &
Inglehart, 2000), and (b) they have collected rel-
evant nationally representative panel data. I ap-
ply standardized methods with appropriate con-
trols to three panel data sets: the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics of the United States (PSID),
1990–1997; the Japanese Panel Survey on Con-
sumers (JPSC), 1993–1997; and the Swedish
Household Market and Nonmarket Activity
(SHMNA), 1993–1996.
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BACKGROUND
The Hypotheses
Leading theories of marriage formation are built
on the view that men and women marry when
they are better off doing so than remaining single
(e.g., Becker, 1981). Although these theories com-
monly suggest that women’s economic resources
alter the costs and benefits of entering marriage
for individuals, they differ on how the resources
alter the costs and benefits.
The universality hypothesis, implied by the
theory of specialization and exchange (e.g., Beck-
er, 1981), is the prediction that, in all contexts,
women with a higher (current) economic standing
will delay marriage formation. The proponents of
this theory argue that nonspecialized division of
labor within a family, as indicated in part by a
greater availability of women’s economic resourc-
es, is not as efficient as a specialized division of
labor, in which men work in the labor market and
women work in the home (see Oppenheimer,
1997). According to this theory, the inefficiency
creates disincentives that prevent women with
higher economic standing from entering marriage
(at a given time).
An alternative to the universality hypothesis is
the gender-contextual variation hypothesis, which
suggests that women’s higher economic standing
decreases marriage in countries with a relatively
high degree of role differentiation by gender but
encourages marriage in countries with more egal-
itarian gendered roles. A high degree of role dif-
ferentiation by gender may persist in an industri-
alized country as a product of its historical,
cultural, and ideological conditions (Leslie &
McGee, 2000) and may be sustained in part by its
favorable aggregate economic condition (Oppen-
heimer, 1988). In such a setting, individuals and
organizations typically operate under the assump-
tion that men engage in full-time labor market
work and women engage in full-time housework.
The assumption induces stresses and inefficiencies
in the lives of women who make economic con-
tributions that discourage them and their partners
from forming a marriage (Blossfeld, 1995; Mo-
sesdottir, 2000). Such stresses and inefficiencies
include engaging in the ‘‘second shift’’ (Hochs-
child, 1989) and being excluded from attractive
job opportunities (Treiman & Hartmann, 1981),
which produces stress that spills over into marital
relations (Conger et al., 1990). In contrast, among
industrialized countries that are relatively egali-
tarian (e.g., a context that is sufficiently attractive
for the majority of wives to work), norms and
practices in marriage and at work are more com-
patible with women’s economic contribution and
hence yield fewer stresses and inefficiencies
(South, 2001). In such countries, both men and
women are positively evaluated in the marriage
market on their ability to make economic contri-
butions (Sweeney, 2002).
Recent and contemporary results from indus-
trialized countries, although fragmented and hence
only suggestive, provide reasons to suspect that
the pattern stated in the contextual variation hy-
pothesis may be present. Cross-sectional and ag-
gregate level findings from Japan (Atoh, 1994;
Raymo, 1998) and Italy (Pinelli & De Rose,
1995), which are countries with a relatively high
degree of gendered role differentiation (Norris &
Inglehart, 2000), show that higher income levels
of women (or higher educational levels as their
proxy) are correlated with a lower rate of mar-
riage. More reliable results from longitudinal or
retrospective life history data indicate that, in
more egalitarian settings, such as the United States
(Lichter, McLaughlin, Kephart, & Landry, 1992;
Sweeney, 2002), Sweden (Bracher & Santow,
1998), and Australia (Santow & Bracher, 1994),
higher levels of women’s earnings are linked to a
greater chance of first marriage at a given time.
Before concluding that the contextual variation
hypothesis is supported, however, a systematic
analysis with standardized methods and individu-
al-level longitudinal data is needed. The pattern in
the existing literature may simply reflect major
discrepancies in analytical designs across studies
or major methodological limitations within a
study (e.g., inadequate controls and simultaneous
causality problems).
Japan, the United States, and Sweden as
Contexts of Gender
Japanese, Americans, and Swedes vary substan-
tially in the degree to which they assign work and
family roles to a specific gender, as reflected con-
sistently in attitudinal and behavioral data. Spe-
cifically, Japanese are the most likely to assign
labor market work to men and housework to
women, Swedes are the least likely, and Ameri-
cans are situated between the two. Attitudinal data
on the division of labor by gender show that, in
1982, almost two thirds of the Japanese women
surveyed (60%), about a quarter of the American
women (26%), and only 13% of the Swedish
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women agreed with the statement, ‘‘Women are
supposed to work in the home and men are sup-
posed to work in the labor market’’ (Inoue &
Ehara, 1995). By 1997, the percentage of Japanese
women who agreed with this statement decreased
to approximately 40% (those for Swedish and
American women are not available), a percentage
still substantially higher than that of the American
and Swedish samples in 1982 (Gender Equality
Bureau, 1998). Data on attitudes toward politi-
cians show that among equivalent samples from
six industrialized countries that are similarly afflu-
ent (i.e., Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, West
Germany, and the United States), Japanese are the
most likely to preferentially assign political work
to men over women, and Swedes and Norwegians
are the least likely to show such preferences (Nor-
ris & Inglehart, 2000). Norris and Inglehart also
showed that the preferential assignment of politi-
cal work to men among the Japanese is stronger
than that among respondents of many developing
countries, including India, Chile, and Taiwan. Be-
havioral data on time use from the mid-1990s
(Juster, Ono, & Stafford, 1999) indicate that
Swedish women allocate only 15% more of their
work time to housework (as opposed to labor mar-
ket work) than do Swedish men, U.S. women al-
locate 30% more of their work time to housework
than do U.S. men, and Japanese women allocate
47% more of their work time to housework than
do men.
Other statistics suggest that, in countries with
a higher degree of role differentiation by gender,
women receive smaller economic returns from
their human capital investment than do men,
which may be a source of stress and inefficiency
for working women. Gendered gap in earnings,
which is often cited as an index of gendered dis-
crimination at work (Treiman & Hartmann, 1981),
is the largest in Japan, smaller in the United States
than in Japan, and the smallest in Sweden. Blau
and Kahn (2000) find that, from 1994 to 1998
among full-time workers, women’s average earn-
ings as a proportion of men’s was 64% in Japan,
76% in the United States, and 84% in Sweden. In
contrast, no gendered gap in human capital ac-
cumulation for entry-level work, as measured by
the expected years of education, is found in any
of the three countries, including Japan (World
Bank, 2001). Employment discrimination on the
basis of gender is illegal in all three countries
(Meyersson-Milgrom, Petersen, & Snartland,
2001; Thode, Esche, & Gramke, 2001). Thus,
laws and policies may not necessarily reflect the
extent of exclusion experienced by women in
these countries. The magnitude of the gendered
gap observed across countries, however, is corre-
lated with the percentage of women in positions
of institutional influence. As of June 2000, the
percentage of female parliamentarians (i.e., those
elected into the lower house of the national par-
liament) was 43% in Sweden, 13% in the United
States, and only 5% in Japan (Norris & Inglehart,
2000).
These statistics on gender, combined with the
consistent findings among previous studies that a
higher level of women’s income increases the
chance of marriage at a given time in the contem-
porary United States (Lichter et al., 1992; Swee-
ney, 2002), suggest a specific contextual variation
hypothesis: Women’s higher economic standing,
as measured by income, should increase the
chance of first marriage in the United States and
in Sweden (i.e., the more egalitarian contexts on
the basis of gender than the United States) but
should reduce the chance in Japan (i.e., the more
differentiated context on the basis of gender than
the United States). The same hypothesis is derived
from defining a relatively egalitarian context as
one in which the majority of wives are employed:
Less than half (45%) of Japanese wives were
working in 1995 (Gender Equity Bureau, 1998),
but the majority of American (61%) and Swedish
(82%) wives were working in the late 1990s (Sta-
tistics Sweden, 2002; U.S. Bureau of Census,
2001).
Virtually no difference in aggregate economic
positions, as measured by Gross National Income
(GNI, formerly known as Gross National Prod-
uct), are found among the three countries, partic-
ularly on the logarithmic scale (Norris & Ingle-
hart, 2000). The countries differ somewhat in
income range (Smeeding, 2001); however, no
available theories lead to the expectation that in-
come range is linked to cross-national variation in
the relationship between women’s income and first
marriage timing. Because previous research on the
U.S. and Sweden reports that marriage timing and
women’s income are correlated with education
(e.g., Sweeney, 2002), economic position of men
in the local area (e.g., Lewis & Oppenheimer,
2000), sex ratio (e.g., South & Trent, 1988), co-
habitation (Bracher & Santow, 1998), school en-
rollment status (e.g., Oppenheimer & Lew, 1995),
and premarital fertility (e.g., Duvander, 1999),
these conditions are controlled in the analysis.
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METHOD
To test the universality hypothesis against the con-
textual variation hypothesis, public use panel data
sets from Japan (JPSC), the United States (PSID),
and Sweden (SHMNA) are analyzed. These panel
surveys follow individuals over time, recording
changes in their economic status and family struc-
ture. The sample for analysis from each country
is restricted to never-married women because the
formation of second and higher order marriages
may involve different social processes from that
of the first marriage (Sweet & Bumpass, 1987).
Women in the sample are not excluded on the ba-
sis of their employment status. Each of the three
panels is described briefly in more detail in the
next three paragraphs.
The JPSC is an annual panel survey conducted
by the Institute for Research on Household Eco-
nomics. Five waves of data, collected annually be-
tween 1993 and 1997, are available for public use.
The national representative sample of a cohort of
young women aged 25 to 34 contains approxi-
mately 1,000 married and 500 unmarried women
(almost all of whom were never married) at the
baseline year of 1993. Each year, the women were
asked about themselves, their husbands and chil-
dren, and other relatives present in the household.
The PSID, a longitudinal panel survey with a
national representative sample of individuals and
households in the United States, is conducted by
the Survey Research Center of the University of
Michigan. It followed individuals and families an-
nually between 1968 and 1997. Respondents are
generally heads of the household who answer
questions about family members. Begun with
5,500 households, the sample has increased as the
children of baseline families established their own
households (‘‘split-off’’ families). To standardize
the U.S. analytic sample to the Japanese and
Swedish samples, which contain solely majority
race respondents, only data for non-Hispanic
Whites are included in the analysis. Although the
panel has a large sample of individuals (approxi-
mately 26,000 in 1990), which includes children,
the elderly, and married adults, it has a relatively
small sample of interest for this study. About
3,650 White women between the ages of 18 and
55 are in the panel in 1990, but the number de-
clines substantially when further restricting the
sample to never-married women.
The SHMNA is a Swedish panel data set col-
lected in the Department of Economics at Uppsala
University. It began in 1984 with a national rep-
resentative sample of more than 2,300 households,
consisting of household heads age 18 to 74. The
household members were interviewed again in
1986, 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1996. The structure
of the sample is generally similar to that of the
PSID. The Swedish data set has some limitations
for the purpose of this study, such as infrequently
ascertained marital status in the 1980s and the low
quality of retrospective marital history informa-
tion. Also, because of the anomalous rise in mar-
riage rates in 1989 with the widow’s pension re-
form (Hoem, 1991), the analysis excludes data
from the 1991 wave, which contain information
on marriages formed between 1988 and 1991.
Thus, only two waves of Swedish panel data,
1993 and 1996, are used in the analysis, with the
information from the retrospective marital history
component excluded. Even with these limitations,
the Swedish Household Market and Nonmarket
Activity is the only longitudinal data set publicly
available in Sweden.
The Japanese cohort data are relatively restrict-
ed in age range. In contrast, an open age range is
available for the American and Swedish samples,
which provides flexibility in defining the Ameri-
can and Swedish cohorts used for analysis. By
cohorts, I refer to samples restricted in age range
at the first year of observation, and which are fol-
lowed up without replacement. I used three alter-
native age ranges to define the American and
Swedish cohorts, all of which yielded the same
results regarding the effect of women’s income on
the chance of first marriage. First, I used the max-
imum age range available in each of the two data
sets at the first year of observation: 18–53 and 18–
57 for the American and Swedish samples, re-
spectively. Second, I used the same age range as
available in the Japanese sample: 25–34 in the
first year of observation. Third, I used the 10th to
the 99th percentile age range in which first mar-
riages are formed in the United States and Swe-
den. This approach modifies the second approach
by adjusting for the fact that first marriages form
in a larger age range in the United States and Swe-
den than in Japan. Data from the 1995 Japanese
Census (Ministry of Public Management, 1995)
indicate that the age range over the observational
periods of the Japanese sample (25–39) excludes
the ages in which the earliest 9% and the latest
1% of first marriages occur in the country. Using
information on data published by the United
States and Swedish governments (Statistics Swe-
den, 2002; U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services, 1995), the age ranges of the American
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and Swedish samples were chosen in ways that
eliminated the ages in which the earliest 9% and
the latest 1% of the first marriages form in the
two countries. The resulting age range was 19–36
in the first year of observation (26–43 in the last
year) for the American sample and 26–52 in the
first year (29–55 in the last year) for the Swedish
sample. The results presented here are from the
use of the last approach to restricting the Ameri-
can and Swedish age range.
For the Japanese and the American samples,
the observational period is 1 calendar year, with
four and seven observational periods, respective-
ly. A sample member is dropped once she marries.
The risks are calculated for each individual at a
given age under the assumption of proportionality
(i.e., no interaction effect between a covariate and
time) typical to hazard models. The Swedish sam-
ple has one observational period, which spans 3
years, partly because of the limitation in the ret-
rospective data. As a result, the covariates for the
Swedish data are measured at 3 years prior to year
t rather than 1 year prior to year t. Assessments
from the Japanese and American samples showed
that the use of one 3-year interval instead of three
1-year intervals to observe first marriages in-
creased the magnitude of the coefficients and the
standard errors proportionally. It did not alter the
sign and the statistical significance of the coeffi-
cients, however, which are the indicators of inter-
est in this study.
Dependent Variable
Log-odds of a first marriage in time interval t is
the dependent variable. It is coded 1 if married in
time interval t, and 0 otherwise. First union,
which combines first cohabitation and first mar-
riage, was not a useful alternative dependent var-
iable for the American and Swedish samples be-
cause marriage and cohabitation are not
equivalent unions in the two countries, and the
Swedish and American panel data sets have in-
complete information on cohabitation history and
no information on the order of the observed co-
habitation.
Covariates
The covariate of interest in this study is women’s
actual total income (1995 U.S. dollars) at time
t 2 1 (year) or t 2 3 (years). It is adjusted across
years and countries with the consumer price index
and purchasing power parity. Total income (zero
income included) consists of a variety of compo-
nents, such as labor income, income from assets,
and transfer income, and is included in the re-
gressions in a logarithmic form. In the Japanese
sample, some women (approximately 10 persons
per year) quit their jobs in anticipation of a mar-
riage. To correct for this endogeneity problem, I
use these women’s income in year t 2 2 (2 years
prior, adjusted for inflation) as estimates of their
income in year t 2 1 (the previous year) had they
not quit their job in anticipation of a marriage.
Measures of women’s future economic pros-
pects and the quantity and quality of men in the
local area are included as control variables. The
variable years of education at time t 2 1 or t 2
3 or the total number of years of schooling at-
tained at the time of the interview measures wom-
en’s future economic prospects with a common
metric in all three countries (Treiman, 1977). To
control for the quantity and quality of the men in
the local marriage market (i.e., women’s potential
mates), two variables are used: sex ratio in the
local area of the persons within the respondent’s
5-year age group and mean annual labor income
of men in the local area in the same age group
at year t 2 1 or t 2 3 (1995 U.S. dollars). Local
areas are defined by prefecture in Japan, metro-
politan area (MSA/PMSA) combined with Public
Use Microdata Sample Areas (PUMA) in the
United States, and municipality in Sweden. Sex
ratios and men’s earnings in the local area for the
United States are obtained from the 1990 Census
5% Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) file.
Labor income of American men is calculated for
White men only, the racial group from which
White women are most likely to select mates
(Qian, 1997). The two measures for Sweden are
constructed from tables of local area sex ratio and
mean earnings for 1995 provided by Statistics
Sweden. The two measures for Japan are from the
1995 Census (Ministry of Public Management,
Home Affairs, & Posts & Telecommunications,
2000) and survey results published by the Min-
istry of Labor for 1995 (1996). Earnings combine
salary and bonus, which is a large part of labor
income in Japan.
In part of the analysis of the Swedish and
American samples, three additional control vari-
ables are included: cohabitation, school enroll-
ment status, and premarital fertility. These vari-
ables are not included in the analysis of the
Japanese sample because of sparse observations.
Live in a cohabiting union in year t 2 1 or t 2
3 is coded 1 if true, and 0 otherwise. In Sweden,
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approximately 80% of the married couples first
entered cohabitation before marriage (Moen,
1989), and, in the more recent years in the United
States, about 50% of the married couples cohab-
ited before marriage (Bumpass & Lu, 2000). Co-
habitation among the Japanese is rare and is es-
timated at 1% among the never-married
population (Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare,
1998), in light of the fact that almost all (96%) of
the never-married Japanese eventually marry
(Ministry of Public Management, 1995), the sta-
tistics imply that a very small percentage of Jap-
anese marriages are preceded by cohabitation. En-
rollment status in year t 2 1 or t 2 3 is included
to account for the potential that enrolled students
may delay marriage until they have obtained their
degree (Blossfeld, 1995; Oppenheimer & Lew,
1995). According to the statistics provided by the
National Center for Educational Statistics (2001),
substantial percentages of 26- to 29-year-old men
and women in the United States were in school in
the mid-to-late 1990s (11%) and Sweden (12.5%).
In contrast, a much smaller percentage (2.5%) of
their Japanese counterparts were in school during
these years. Number of children in year t 2 1 or
t 2 3 is included as a linear term. Comparative
statistics published by the U.S. Bureau of Census
(1994) indicate that nonmarital births accounted
for about 50% of all 1992 births in Sweden, about
30% in the United States, and only about 1% in
Japan.
Age at time t 2 1 or t 2 3 is included as a
time counter. Although measures of parental so-
cioeconomic status, such as father’s and mother’s
educational attainment, were included in the orig-
inal analysis, they were found nonsignificant and
are excluded from the results presented here. Ex-
ploratory analysis of the Japanese sample also in-
cluded a variable to control for coresidence with
parents. The inclusion of this variable did not alter
the Japanese results in a major way. I present a
version of the Japanese results from an equation
that excluded parental coresidence.
Analytical Strategy
Discrete-time event-history regressions are used
to estimate the sign and the statistical significance
of the coefficient of women’s income in the three
countries. For the Swedish case, where there is
only one observational period, the regressions be-
come binary logistic regressions. The equations
are applied to data from each country separately.
A common response to discrete-time event-his-
tory models is that multiple observations per per-
son and different number of observations per per-
son may cause observational dependence that
biases the standard errors and the test statistics
(Allison, 1995). Allison notes and empirically
demonstrates that these concerns are not applica-
ble to event-history models when the event ana-
lyzed occurs only once in an individual’s life, such
as first marriage. In these models, multiple obser-
vations are used to calculate the likelihood function,
allowing a researcher to estimate the conditional
probability of an event occurring at time t, given that
the event has not occurred prior to time t.
One equation is applied to the Japanese sample
and two equations are applied to the American
and Swedish samples. The first equation includes
all covariates except for school enrollment, num-
ber of children, and cohabitation. The coefficient
estimate of women’s income in this equation
yields the effect of women’s current economic
standing on the chance of first marriage in a pe-
riod, net of the effects of women’s future econom-
ic prospect, as measured by women’s education,
and the quantity and quality of men in the local
area, as measured by sex ratio and average earn-
ings of men. The second equation adds the three
covariates (i.e., enrollment, children, and cohabi-
tation) to the first equation and is applied only to
the American and Swedish samples. This equation
serves as a sensitivity test to processes that are
nearly absent among never-married women in the
age range in Japan. The coefficients obtained from
the first and second equations are converted to
odds multipliers, which aid interpretation by in-
dicating the multiplicative change in the odds with
a unit increase in a covariate. They are the ex-
ponent of the coefficient estimates.
Table 1 shows the means and standard devia-
tions of the covariates for the person-periods. The
mean annual incomes are reported in the prelo-
garithmic form. In the Japanese cohort sample, of
the 456 never-married women, 159 married over
the subsequent 4 years (1994–1997). In the Amer-
ican cohort sample, of the 410 never-married
American women aged 19–36 in 1990, 179 mar-
ried over the 7 years of observation (1991–1997).
In the Swedish cohort sample, of the 455 never-
married Swedish women aged 26–52 in 1993, 96
married by the 1996 panel. Because more and
shorter person-periods are available from the Jap-
anese and American data, they indicate lower
marriage rates (.13 and .09, respectively) than do
the Swedish person-periods (.21). When propor-
tions of Japanese and American women who mar-
281Women’s Economic Standing









Marriage in a period .13 .33 .09 .26 .21 .41
Women’s economic standing
Total income (31,000) 17.32 7.28 16.29 27.24 10.47 3.89
Controls
Future economic prospects
Education 13.74 1.53 12.84 1.95 11.61 1.43
Quantity and quality of men in the local area
Sex ratio in the local area



































Age 29.03 2.84 31.53 5.13 35.33 2.71
n (person-periods) 1,131 2,326 455
Note: Data are from the Japanese Panel Survey on Consumers, Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and Swedish Household
Market and Nonmarket Activity.
aA woman in the Swedish sample has data for only one period of observation. In contrast, a woman in the Japanese and
American samples has data for multiple periods of observation.
ry over the years are calculated, they are consid-
erably higher (.35 and .44, respectively) than the
Swedish proportion of .21.
The average income level of the Japanese sam-
ple may appear too high to individuals unfamiliar
with contemporary Japan. The average annual in-
come of these never-married Japanese women is
actually lower, however, than the average annual
earnings of Japanese women who are employed
full time year around, as reported by the Ministry
of Labor (1996). This is partly because some of
the sample members do not work (at one time)
during the year. According to the Ministry (p. 76),
the average salary plus bonus of a 25- to 29-year-
old Japanese woman with 5–9 years of work ex-
perience who is employed full time all year is
323,600 yen per month, or approximately $1,938
per month (1995 U.S. dollars, Consumer Price In-
dex—Purchasing Power Parity adjusted) and
$23,256 annually (Ministry of Labor, p. 76).
RESULTS
Table 2 displays results from the two sets of re-
gressions, those excluding school enrollment, co-
habitation, and number of children for the three
countries (columns 1, 2, and 4), and those includ-
ing the three control variables for the American
and Swedish samples (columns 3 and 5). It also
displays the corresponding odds multipliers. The
estimates presented here are from samples of
women in the 10th to the 99th percentile of age
ranges in which (early to late) first marriages form
in the three countries. The first set of results in
columns 1, 2, and 4 measures the effect of wom-
en’s income on the chance of first marriage, net
of the effect of women’s education, local area sex
ratio, and men’s average earnings in the local area.
The sign of the coefficient of women’s income is
negative in the Japanese sample (Column 1) and
positive in the American (Column 2) and the
Swedish samples (Column 4), which is consistent
with the contextual variation hypothesis and con-
trary to the universality hypothesis. More specif-
ically, although Japanese women with a higher
level of income in the previous period are less
likely to marry in the current period than are
women with a lower level of income, American
and Swedish women with a higher level of income
are more likely to marry in the period. Odds mul-
tipliers indicate that, net of the effects of educa-
tion, local area sex ratio, and men’s average earn-
ings in the local area, Japanese women’s chance
of first marriage in a year declines approximately
3% with each successive increase in income. In
contrast, the same increase in women’s income
raises the chance of first marriage in a year by
282 Journal of Marriage and Family
TABLE 2. REGRESSIONS PREDICTING THE LOG-ODDS OF FIRST MARRIAGE AMONG NEVER-MARRIED WOMEN IN JAPAN,


























Quantity and quality of men in the local area
















Cohabitation — — — — 1.761**
(.556)
5.818
Enrollment — — — — 2.700*
(.334)
0.497

















Log likelihood 2472.996 2467.140 2410.504
n 1,131 2,326
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Data are from the Japanese Panel Survey on Consumers, Panel Study of Income
Dynamics, and Swedish Household Market and Nonmarket Activity.
*p , .05. **p , .01. ***p , .001 (two-tailed tests).
2.1% for the American women and by 6.4% over
the 3-year period for Swedish women.
Is the conclusion drawn from the coefficients
of women’s income in the first equation (columns
1, 3, and 5) altered when controlling for school
enrollment, cohabitation, and premarital births
(i.e., the influences of processes that receive rel-
atively little weight in the Japanese case)? The
second set of estimates suggests this is not the
case. The coefficient estimates of women’s in-
come for the Swedish and the U.S. samples in the
second set of regressions (columns 3 and 5), to-
gether with those in the first (columns 2 and 4),
indicate that they are weakened but not changed
in sign or statistical significance after controlling
for the three influences. Additional path analysis
indicated that the indirect effect of women’s in-
come on the chance of first marriage through co-
habitation in Sweden and the United States ac-
counted for the weakening effect of women’s
income relative to that estimated in the first equa-
tion (not shown). That is, the results suggest that
in these two countries, a higher level of women’s
income increases the chance of cohabitation,
which in turn raises the chance of first marriage.
Thus, this indirect effect composes part of the ef-
fect of women’s income estimated in the first
equation for the Swedish and U.S. samples. The
odds multipliers indicate that, once removing the
indirect effect of women’s income through cohab-
itation, a $1,000 increase in women’s income now
raises the risk of marriage by 1.6% in 1 year
among the single American women and by 5.3%
in 3 years among the single Swedish women.
DISCUSSION
This study tests the universality hypothesis against
the contextual variation hypothesis by investigat-
















































measured by their income, prevents first marriage
formation in all national contexts or only in na-
tional contexts that are relatively differentiated by
gender. It is the first systematic test of the com-
peting cross-national hypotheses with data from
Japan, the United States, and Sweden. In the case
of Japan, it is the first report of results on the
effect of never-married women’s income on their
first marriage timing using longitudinal data.
The results support the contextual variation hy-
pothesis and counter the universality hypothesis
implied by the theory of specialization and ex-
change. In particular, for samples of each country,
when controlling for the level of education, local
area sex ratio, and earnings of men in the local
area, a higher level of women’s income decreases
the chance of first marriage in a period among
Japanese women but increases the chance of first
marriage among both American and Swedish
women. The sign reversal in the effect of women’s
income across contexts of gender has not been
captured in intracountry studies that use historical
contexts to proxy shifts in the degree of role dif-
ferentiation by gender (e.g., Santow & Bracher,
1994; Sweeney, 2002). The results are consistent
with the view that when women make economic
contributions in industrialized countries with a rel-
atively high degree of role differentiation, they ex-
perience stresses and inefficiencies in their lives
in ways that conflict with the formation of mar-
riage. In countries with a relatively low degree of
role differentiation by gender, however, women of
high economic status are more attractive in the
marriage market as a result of the symmetry in
the criteria of mate selection between the sexes
(Duvander, 1999; Sweeney, 2002).
The analyses were limited by data availability.
For example, the age range in which the earliest
9% of first marriages take place is eliminated from
the analysis as a result of the age restrictions on
the Japanese sample. In the Swedish and the
American samples, additional analyses indicated
that the basic results do not change with the in-
clusion of women younger than age 25. I did not
have data on Japanese women younger than age
25, however. It is possible that an analysis of mi-
crolevel longitudinal data with never-married Jap-
anese women younger than age 25 would lead to
an alternative conclusion, but Raymo’s (1998) ag-
gregate level findings suggest otherwise. In addi-
tion, I was not able to estimate empirically the
influences of school enrollment, cohabitation, and
premarital fertility on the chance of first marriage
in Japan. To estimate these influences in Japan, I
would need a longitudinal data set with a very
large sample of never-married Japanese women.
Such data are currently unavailable. Finally, I an-
alyzed data from only three affluent industrialized
countries. Whether the inclusion of additional af-
fluent industrialized countries with similar aggre-
gate economic positions would alter the conclu-
sion needs to be examined in future studies.
Despite these constraints, the results provide
insights into whether postindustrial societies are at
growing risk for the demise of marriage (e.g.,
Bumpass, 1998). They imply that marriage is sup-
pressed by women’s expanding economic contri-
bution only in those industrialized countries with
a relatively high degree of role differentiation by
gender, such as Japan. Whether an industrialized
country uses female labor to meet its requirements
and transforms its norms in ways that promote a
compatibility between women’s economic contri-
bution and marriage formation may be mediated
by the country’s background. One can argue that
only an atypical industrialized country would ex-
perience severe lags in the adoption of norms and
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practices that tend to support women’s economic
contribution as a result of its sociocultural and
economic background. Industrialized countries
more commonly depend on the labor-force partic-
ipation of both men and women to sustain their
economic growth (Oppenheimer, 1970) and more
easily accept and adopt supportive norms and
practices. The results also imply that industriali-
zation is not a sufficient condition to produce uni-
formity in the effect of women’s economic stand-
ing on marriage formation.
The findings have policy implications. For ex-
ample, as Japanese women gain equality by gen-
der, they could reverse the marriage-depressive ef-
fect of their economic resources on first marriage
timing. This is encouraging news for Japanese po-
litical leaders, who have expressed major concerns
over the declining marriage rates, which is poten-
tially induced by the increasing economic partic-
ipation of women (Ministry of Health, Labor, &
Welfare, 1998). They recognize that low marriage
rates lead to low fertility rates and the instability
of the social security system (Atoh, 1994). The
Japanese situation demonstrates that when an in-
dustrialized country does not experience institu-
tional and cultural change with the increasing de-
mand for female labor, it could encounter
unanticipated long-term consequences.
The results indicate that in the United States
and Sweden, a higher level of women’s income
indirectly raises the chance of marriage by en-
couraging cohabitation. They are consistent with
previous findings (e.g., Bracher & Santow, 1998;
Clarkberg, 1999; Duvander, 1999) and with the
view that cohabitation is a period in which (dual-
career) couples negotiate the division of labor to
make marriage formation viable (Cherlin, 2000;
Manning & Smock, 1995; Seltzer, 2000). They
imply that as women make greater economic con-
tributions, the need for couples to negotiate the
division of labor during cohabitation before mar-
riage increases.
Investigation of whether aggregate economic
conditions differentiate the effect of women’s in-
come (on the chance of first marriage) across
countries is out of the scope of this study. By fo-
cusing on the three industrialized countries with
similar aggregate economic standing, this study
holds constant that dimension of potential influ-
ence. If the influence of aggregate economic con-
ditions were to be studied, another set of countries
should be selected that vary substantially on the
dimension of aggregate economic conditions but
have a similar level of role differentiation by gen-
der. Such an investigation may be pursued in a
separate study.
An even more ambitious extension of this
study would place the analysis in a formal mul-
tilevel framework. In this framework, the country-
level effects (e.g., gendered expectation of the
population and per capita GNI) would be inter-
acted with individual-level effects, such as wom-
en’s income. These interaction terms would allow
a researcher to test, for example, whether the mag-
nitude of the effect of women’s income differs
significantly with variation in a country-level var-
iable. Empirical estimation of a multilevel model
would require the inclusion of a substantial num-
ber of additional countries. Entwisle and Mason
(1985) report that estimating two macrolevel ef-
fects requires at least 15 countries. A formal mul-
tilevel study would also require data (e.g., the
length of the observed period) that are even more
standardized than those available in this study, so
that the magnitude of the effect of women’s in-
come could be compared across countries. The
current study serves as a first step toward such a
long-term effort.
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